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DOGMATISM AND SKEPTICISM IN LAW
LEE LOEVINGER*

Recently in a Minneapolis court room an intellectual young
college student stood before the bench for sentencing. He had been
convicted of violating the draft act. The evidence showed that he
had complied with all the requirements of the law and the directives
of the draft board until he was to be sworn into military service.
Then he refused to take the oath or serve. The reason he gave was
that he had a duty to obey God's law which was superior to any
human relation, that he would accordingly fight only in wars which
were ordained by God, and that he had the right to determine which
were such wars. Believing that the military service which was demanded by the United States government did hot have such divine
sanction, he refused to participate. Asked by the judge if he had
anything to say before sentence was imposed, he replied, "Nothing,
except that I am dedicated to God." 1
The difficulty of the dilemma presented to the court in such a
case as this is only partially indicated by the fact that the district
court found this attitude to be a violation of the statute while the
court of appeals held that the youth's beliefs amounted to such "conscientious objection" as to excuse him from the duty of military
service.' But these decisions were concerned merely with issues of
statutory interpretation. More profound and vastly more troubling
is the problem of moral judgment presented by the individual who,
without hope of personal gain or advantage, as a matter of conscientious belief in principle refuses to obey a duly enacted law.
While few of us have a conscience which would drive us this far,
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. See Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, January 3, 1954, p. 6.
2. Taffs v. United States, 208 F. 2d 329 (8th Cir. 1953). For other
similar cases see, United States v. Hartman, 22 U. S. L. Week 2313 (2d Cir.
Jan. 8, 1954); United States v. Perkanski, 22 U. S. L. Week 2185 (2d Cir.
Oct. 23, 1953) ; Annet v. United States, 205 F. 2d 689 (10th Cir. 1953);
Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S.389 (1953).
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most will feel some sympathy, and perhaps even respect and admiration, for such a man. But, if this is our attitude, why then do we obey
the law in other matters where we may consider it to be erroneous
or personally distasteful? Is it merely because the government is
powerful and we too cowardly to defy it, or are there other, more
rational, reasons for obeying the law even where it may run
counter to personal beliefs and principles? Conversely, from the
viewpoint of the court, what basis is there for asserting the authority
of the law, and what guidance is available when the law apparently
conflicts with moral principle?
These questions are not new. Long before the current crop of
"conscientious objector" cases, the debate as to why and when the
individual should obey the law had engrossed the attention of
philosophers, theologians, reformers, lawyers and a moetly array
of other thoughtfully inclined men. The issues have almost inevitably involved fundamental attitudes towards life and the world, and,
as there has never been any general agreement regarding these,
so there has never been any generally acceptable answer to the
search for what may be called the "moral foundation of law." Each
school of philosophy has developed its own answer, and each philosopher his own version of each answer. The majority of men, not
being very thoughtful, are only dimly aware of the problem and
have only vague and somewhat amorphous notions of their own
attitudes toward it. However, as philosophy is in part the attempt
to rationalize and systematize otherwise disorderly concepts and
conduct so that they may be more easily comprehensible, the more
prevalent ideas toward these matters may be articulated and
analyzed.
The fundamental questions with which all the systems of legal
philosophy seem to be concerned are: First, whose approval determines moral or legal justification? Second, what standard is employed or implied in such approval? Third, how is such determination communicated to the community? Of these questions, the first
two have received the most attention from philosophers, while the
third has often been omitted, treated casually, or regarded as implied in the response to the first two. The possible answers to the
first question, by whom matters of morals are ultimately to be
decided, are (a) the human community, (b) the governing elite,
(c) the individual, or (d) the Divinity. The standards by which
human beings may reach their own determinations as to such questions seem to involve choices between practical experience, conven-
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tion or custom, and the satisfaction or pleasure of one or a group.
The standards by which a divine judgment may be made are not
usually explored in philosophic speculation.
The systems of philosophy which have been popular are not
exclusively classified by this logical analysis. Thus the right of the
elite to determine matters of morals for the rest of the community is
usually said to rest upon some special delegation by or access to
Divinity. However, in general, the philosophies of law tend to be
predominantly either secular or religious in character. Correspondingly, the secular philosophies tend to be concerned with questions
as to the standards that may be employed in reaching moral determinations, while the religious philosophies avoid this problem. As
yet, none of the systems of legal philosophy has succeeded in securing either universal acceptance or even the general adherence of
the members of any organized political community.
In the long run all men are pragmatists most of the time. At least
those who live long enough to have a set of conscious ideas capable
of being generalized into anything that may be called a philosophy
inevitably judge ideas by results, insofar as they are able to ascertain results and casual connections. There are several reasons for
this. The most obvious and most important is that such an attitude
is more or less a condition of survival. The baby who thinks that the
pretty glow of a flame is attractive either learns that such an attraction leads to pain and injury or eventually ends as a cinder. All
who survive and escape incarceration learn to modify a vast number of ideas and impulses on the basis of practical consequences. Another, less potent, reason is that the pragmatic approach is the one
most generally accepted method of persuasion or demonstration of
validity and truth. Predilections, prejudices and philosophies differ
widely, and disputants frequently differ not only as to conclusions
but even as to the evidence that is acceptable in support of their
conclusions. But, where such an appeal is possible, the challenge
to a test by trial and observation is not often rejected or easily
disdained.
The pragmatic approach presents no great difficulty so long as
the results sought are immediate and the value of the results is
apparent, as in the danger of fire, the necessity of food, the characteristics of materials, and the prowess of a human being. There
are, indeed, some philosophers who insist that to attach value even
to such a thing as the satisfaction of hunger is to commit oneself
to a scale of values which must ultimately rest upon some philosophi-
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cal scheme. But the overwhelming majority of people undoubtedly
take the common-sense approach that philosophy must be justified
by its contribution to human survival and satisfaction, and not the
reverse.
So, many philosophers take pragmatism as a sufficient intellectual foundation for our systems of law and morals. But difficulties
and disagreements concerning values begin to arise when we seek
to deal with more abstract concepts and experience, where the relationship between cause and effect is not immediate or obvious. Even
the common maxim that "honesty is the best policy" involves us
in subtle and devious difficulties when we seek to prove it by reference to a fundamental system of ethics. With more abstract concepts such as "free speech" or "the golden rule," it becomes even
more difficult to remain purely pragmatic. A host of problems arises
when we ask to assay the consequences of such ideas. What results
shall we watch for and regard as significant? How shall we determine causal relations? What time span shall we take as a fair test?
These, and similar difficulties, make the seeming certainty and objectivity of the pragmatic approach largely illusory.
Nevertheless, there is a strong general conviction in contemporary society that such things as "honesty," "free speech," "the
golden rule," and various other concepts do represent real and
important values for man. Most people probably accept such ideas
because they are traditional and endemic. Indeed, there are several
schools of philosophy which argue that custom or convention are all
the justification needed for ethical and legal principles. However
those who are philosophers, whether by choice or destiny, usually
are addicted to theorizing and speculation, and find such a view
much too simple to suit them.
A related but somewhat more elaborate philosophical theory is
that usually called "utilitarianism" which postulates that ethical and
legal principles are to be tested by the standard of the "greatest
happiness of the greatest number." This is, on the face of it, a
very plausible ethical philosophy, especially for a democratic society.
However, it involves much the same difficulties in operation that an
attempt to be consistently pragmatic does. Since a man is normally
the best judge of his own happiness, the most obvious method of
determining it is to ask him. Similarly, the most obvious way to
determine the happiness of the greatest number is to count them,
or to take a vote. This is, however, the end of simplicity in the
matter. The number of issues that can be submitted to a popular
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vote in a populous country is severly limited. Further, the amount
of information available to the greatest number is even more severely
limited, so that there is real doubt whether any large number have
any basis whatsoever for determining whether a particular law will
or will not contribute to their happiness. Even assuming that a substantial number of laws could be submitted to a popular referendum,
this still would give little assistance in the vastly more numerous
problems of applying the laws to individual cases. To the extent that
the populace expresses general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with an
administration in an election, it may be said that the principle of
utilitarianism works effectively. But it is evident that this is a crude
and equivocal expression of ethical, political or legal convictions.
A legal system which could make no finer discriminations than this
would be impotent and useless. Therefore a legal theory must be
capable of much more precise application to be very useful.
But if we are unable to utilize the test of experience, unwilling to
accept the judgment of tradition or convention, and dissatisfied with
the "principle of utility," then we are left with no alternative basis
for moral foundations but an appeal to authority. 3 The authority to
which questions are referred may be either human or divine, but
the process of reference necessarily involves two important assumptions : first, that the authority is in some manner better qualified than
the rest of us to determine the issues, and, second, that there are
available means of intelligible communication on the issues with the
authority.
The traditional approach to the matter of devising a philosphical
3. The discussion in the text does not pretend to be an exhaustive mention or review of all the theories of law, but rather undertakes to epitomize
the principal classes of secular philosophies on the one hand, and the principal
classes of "natural law" philosophies on the other. For a somewhat more
detailed list of the theories of law, see Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 60-67 (1922). Pound says that there have been twelve distinguishable conceptions of law, which he lists as: 1. A divinely ordained
set of rules for human action. 2. A tradition of customs acceptable to the
gods. 3. The recorded wisdom of wise men. 4. A philosophically discovered
system of principles which express the nature of things. 5. The body of
declarations of an eternal and immutable moral code. 6. A body of agreements
between men in a politically organized society as to their relations with one
another. 7. A reflection of the divine reason governing the universe. S. The
commands of the sovereign authority in organized society. 9. A system of
precepts discovered by human experience whereby the individual will realize
the most complete freedom consistent with like freedom of others. 10. A system of principles whereby the life of man is controlled by reason, or the will
of one individual is harmonized with those of others. 11. A system of rules
imposed on men in society by the dominant class for the time being. 12. The
dictates of economic or social laws regarding human conduct, discovered by
observation and worked out through experience. For a more detailed analysis
of the concepts of law that have prevailed in the history of jurisprudence, see
Stone, infra note 14.
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justification for law, as such, takes these assumptions in its stride.
It postulates the existence of a set of basic principles, commonly
called "natural law," which derives its authority by virtue of divine
promulgation, and which is discoverable either through specific
revelation to a chosen few, or (what comes to much the same thing)
by use of the faculty of "reason" which is bestowed upon man so
that he may thus discover the principles of "natural law."
This statement is, of course, a considerable over-simplification of
a theory that has received as much prolix elaboration as perhaps any
other in man's garrulous history. Some writers have argued for a
"law of nature" that was not immediately related to any god.
Others have insisted that the foundation of all law must be in the
immediate word of God as contained in specific revelations. The
view established by the scholastics of the middle ages, and the most
widely held doctrine, is that "natural law" is to be found in the
order of nature established by God and discovered by exercise
of man's faculty of reason. This view was virtually unchallenged
from the age of Aquinas until the time of Bentham. During the last
century, however, the emphasis has been shifted from the divine
origin or sanction to the asserted existence of basic principles in the
"order of nature." However, this shift has not sufficiently dispelled
the aura of mysticism and supernaturalism surrounding "natural
law" to secure general contemporary acceptance for it.
Thus, in this century it can be said:
"To defend a doctrine of natural rights today, requires either
insensibility to the world's progress or else considerable courage in the face of it. Whether all doctrines of natural rights of
man died with the French Revolution or were killed by the historical learning of the nineteenth century, every one who enjoys
the consciousness of being enlightened knows that they are, and
by right ought to be, dead. The attempt to defend a doctrine of
natural rights before historians and political scientists would be
treated very much like an attempt to defend the belief in witchcraft. It would be regarded as emanating only from the intellectual underworld. And yet, while in this country only old judges
and hopelessly antiquated text-book writers still cling to this
supposedly eighteenth-century doctrine, on the Continent the
doctrine of natural law has been revived by advanced jurists of
diverse schools. . ...4
Without attempting to judge what constitutes a "revival," it can
be said that in this country in more recent years there have been
many articulate and vigorous advocates of a "natural law" view4. M. R. Cohen, in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and
Legal Philosophy 615-616 (1951).
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point. These range from practicing lawyers and judges5 to academic
philosophers. One of the most forceful, thorough and learned statements of the "natural law" viewpoint has been made in a recent
book by one of the latter, Professor Wild of Harvard.6 He epitomizes
the modern view of the subject by declaring:
-To identify natural law with the commands (presumably arbitrary) of a transcendant Deity is certainly to convey an erron5. See Apsey, The Natural Law: Scientific or Supernatural, 37 A. B.

A. J. 35 et seq. (1951).
6. John Wild, Plato's M&odem Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law
(University of Chicago Press, 1953). Professor Wild's book is astonishingly
learned and is academic in both the best and the worst meaning of that term.
It was written to vindicate both Plato and the theory of natural law. In

undertaking to do the first, Professor Wild crosses swords with most modern
commentators on Plato, and even accuses the standard Jowett translation of
being biased (p. 20). Professor Wild makes frequent references to phrases
and passages in Plato which are set out in the original Greek and which he
cites as support for his interpretation of Plato's intentions. It would take an
extremely learned scholar to make an adequate appraisal of this part of the
book, and this writer frankly confesses his inability to do so. However, it
would appear from Professor Wild's own citation of authorities that his
interpretation of Plato represents a minority view among contemporary
scholars.
The sections of the book wherein the author is concerned with defending
Plato as a historical character are of little interest to the lawyer or the
general reader. Whether they contribute much to the scholarly study of
Greek literature must be left to the judgment of scholars in that field. However, one who has merely read the dialogues must wonder whether the debate
over Plato's personal views as-and if--expressed therein, will ever be settled
with any degree of finality.
In any event, it can hardly be a matter of the first philosophical magnitude whether or not Plato or another first suggested the concepts now embodied in the philosophy of "natural law." Whatever merit or demerit there is
in such a philosophical scheme must be because of its content and not of its
history. Possibly in recognition of this, the second and third parts of the book
are devoted to an exposition of the development and the doctrinal content of
"natural law" as a philosophical system.
While the expositions of "natural law" are considerably more interesting
than the other parts of the book, even these sections will be hard going for
most readers. Professor Wild's style is frequently turgid, and he uses the
terms of philosophy so freely, and often so technically, that anyone unfamiliar
with his special lexicon will be confused, if not wholly lost. Although Professor Wild scoffs at the tendency of modem philosophy to engage in linguistic and semantic study, one suspects that both his writing and his thinking
would be considerably improved if he were to take such studies a little more
seriously. Much of the argument of the book is made in terms of such high
order abstractions that it tends to approach sheer gibberish. Sentences such
as the following are not illuminated by the context from which they have
been taken: "Existence is what it is because of the existence which brings it
out of nothing." (p. 199) "The logical atomist regards goodness as a fixed
determinate structure rather than as an existential category." (p. 216)
"Reality is not made up of properties alone but of existent properties with
active tendencies." (p. 217) ".

.

. this relation of fitness can be read in two

ways from tendency to fulfillment (goodness) or back from fulfillment to
tendency (rightness). The former is less necessary than the latter but more
factual in the sense of sheer thereness." (p. 217)
One is led to suspect that with this, as with much philosophical writing,
the appearance of profundity is due solely to the fact of its obscurity.
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eous impression to the modern mind.... The basic issue between
the defenders of natural law and its opponents has never been
that of theism versus nontheism. This is a peripheral metaphysical issue. The basic issue concerns the nature of moral
norms. Are they grounded in something which exists independently of human interest and opinion, or are they man made? The
philosophers of natural law are moral realists. They hold that
certain moral norms are grounded on nature, not merely on
human decree.... Norms that are not man-made must actually
exist in some sense. They must be embedded in the ontological
structure of things. They are not human construction but ontological categories." "As we have seen.., the theory of natural
law is basically ontological in character. Ethical categories are
...traced back to their ultimate roots in the existential structure
of finite existence.... There are five ontological theses which are
required by any articulate philosophy of natural law. These are:
(1) the world is governed by a normative order embedded in the
very being of its component entities; (2) each finite entity
is marked by an intelligible structure distinguishing it from other
entities, and determining its development in regular ways which
may be expressed by a universal law; (3) the composite structure of any finite entity also includes an active factor of dynamism or tendency which urges it towards further existence not
yet acquired; (4) when a concrete tendency is ordered to act
in accordance with the law described under 2, this action is
natural or right; and (5) good, in the most general sense, is the
realization of tendency, evil the lack of fulfillment."8
To understand this statement, it is important to recognize that
the word "realism" is being used in a special technical sense. In this
usage it denotes the philosophical doctrine stemming from Plato that
universals have a "real" existence independent of the human mind
and discourse." Thus "redness" exists as a universal category, independently of any specific instances of red things and also independently of the conception of redness. For every specific thing
that exists individually-such as house, dog, chair, tree, law and
morals-there is a corresponding universal category which has a
"real" existence independently of any individual existence and apart
from any merely conceptional existence. In this sense, all things, including man, have a "nature," a universal category within which
they are included, which exists independently of any individuals
embodying that "nature." In the realm of philosophy this "nature" is
7. Wild, op. cit. supra note 6, at 104-105.
8. Id. at 137.

9. See the title "Realism" in any standard encyclopedia or text on
philosophy. For a technical discussion of the philosophical fallacy involved, see
Willard V. 0. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, c. 1, On What There Is

(1953).
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called the "essence" of things. Furthermore, this "nature" or
"essence" has certain "tendencies" which are themselves "metaphysical principles" with a "real" existence.10 It is these "tendencies"
which are inherent in the "essence" of things that constitute the system of "natural law" to which civil law should conform. Thus it is
said that "natural law" is not something that is created or established by man but something that is merely "discovered" by man,
and that has an independent existence regardless of its discovery
or recognition.
While some views of "natural law" emphasize the theistic aspect
more strongly and others give less emphasis to the metaphysical
foundation in Platonic "realism," this is, in general, an accurate
presentation of "natural law" philosophy. The attractions of the
theory are apparent. It offers a firm, authoritative and unchanging
basis for our legal system. Although it may require introspective
diligence to "discover" the "natural law," since we are assured it
exists and is adequate to guide us, we may hope to be relieved of all
doubts, fears and anxieties regarding our legal problems as soon as
sufficient effort has been made to disclose its commands. Indeed,
"natural law" offers us a kind of legal heaven wherein error will
not exist and law, morality and justice will coincide completely.
Furthermore, once we have discovered any principle of "natural
law" it will be the same for all men and for all time. One of the
characteristics of "natural law" is that it remains the same for all
men everywhere.1 Thus the problem of uncertainy in the law is
eliminated by the simple expedient of making the law certain and
unchanging.
"Natural law" philosophers tend to derogate more modest
theories of law by characterizing them with such terms as "relativism," "subjectivism" or "scientism." These terms, of course,
are merely pejorative epithets, of no more logical weight than
characterizing natural law philosophy as "superstition." Insofar as
they have any intellectual content, these terms imply that a concept
of morality lacks any validity unless it claims universal and eternal
validity. Since universality and eternity are beyond the reach
of experience, expression or even clear conceptional formulation,
such a proposition is, by its own terms, incapable of either demonstration or refutation. But if the experience and common acceptance
of mankind be taken as any indication, such a propostion is false.
10. Wild, op. cit. mtpra note 6, at 104-105.
11. Id. at 133.
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Morality, in its most basic aspects, varies from time to time and
culture to culture.
As an example, take one of the most important and widely accepted moral principles: that murder is immoral. This has been
accepted by all people, everywhere. However, this is a misleading
universality. The principle is accepted only because the term
"murder" is itself the symbol of a moral judgment. "Murder" is the
killing of a human being by another in circumstances such that the
killing is not sanctioned. If, instead of the normative term, we consider the conduct involved, that is, the killing of one human being
by another, great variations in moral standards will be found. In
the past in various cultures ritual killings of humans have been
accepted as not only moral but, indeed, devoutly pious acts. Killings
in war and in self-defense have been in the past and are today generally regarded as quite moral. Yet there are a sizeable number today
who regard killing in war, or in some wars, as immoral. Most of the
recent cases regarding "conscientious objectors" have involved
members of a religious sect that regards participation in ordinary
wars as immoral but approves participation in theocratic war or
conflict in support or protection of the sect. The draft act itself
recognizes and sanctions religious scruples against any participation
in war. There are some, too, who believe that killing in any war is
immoral and unjustified; and there are many who hope that society
may quickly develop to the stage in which such an attitude is generally accepted. Similarly, capital punishment has been generally
accepted in the past, although many now regard it as primitive and
immoral, and society may well develop to the point of rejecting
such a crude solution to penal problems.1 2 On the other hand,
euthanasia, or the "mercy killing" of hopelessly crippled or diseased persons, is not now recognized as moral or legal. Still there
are some who contend that it should be accepted as proper, and there
is at least the possibility that such an attitude may become the prevailing one in the future.
There is, accordingly, considerable diversity among the situations to which the term "murder" has been thought applicable at
various times and in various cultures. Certain types of homicide
regarded as quite moral in the past are now immoral. Other types
of homicide now regarded as immoral may well be regarded as moral
in the future. Still other kinds of killing which up to now have been
held to be within the moral code will, in all probability, be patently
12. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 284, Murder and the Penalty of Death (Nov. 1952).
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immoral to future generations. Thus, even as to the most basic
moral principles there is an inescapable relation to time and culture,
and, consequently, actual or potential change.
If some wish to maintain that this shows merely that what we
now regard as morality is not a "true morality" in the sense that
it does not correspond with some special idea that they have of
morality-such as the necessity of claiming universal and eternal
validity-then there is no basis for debate or discussion, since the
assertion itself involves the conclusion. However, the only morality
it has been given to mortals to know is that which men have recognized or acted upon in the past and present. This morality is not,
never has been, and gives no promise of becoming, immutable.
It should be noted that this conclusion is inconsistent neither
with theism, religion in general, nor with any particular religion,
except as the disciples of a specific creed may choose to make a
denial of this conclusion an article of faith. This conclusion is consistent with any view that may be taken of Creation and the Creator.
There is no rational necessity, either a priori or a posteriori, for
proceeding from any tenable view of cosmogony or cosmology to a
conclusion as to the non-existence of other worlds containing intelligent beings or as to the existence of universally binding standards
of moral conduct for such beings.' 3 Certainly a Cosmos or a Creator
capable of producing the immense diversity we know to exist, is
equally capable of tolerating, approving or commanding (as one
may choose to regard it) some variation in patterns of proper behavior within that diversity.
Actually a close examination will disclose that the "objectivity"
and "immutability" promised by "natural law" is an illusion. The
Platonic universals are "real" only to a philosopher. No man has
ever been able to show such a "reality" to another man in the same
sense that the "real" objects of scientific study are exhibited to
others. "Natural law" is "objective" only to certain philosophers
and only in a special sense which ordinary language would call
"subjective." In any given case, the sources from which and methods
13. The English astronomer Fred Hoyle calculated in 1949 that there
were probably about a million planetary systems capable of supporting
sentient life within our own galaxy. Taking all the other galaxies together,
he estimated there might well be a hundred trillion of such planteary systems. New York Times, Sept. 25, 1949, p. E 9. If the number is even near to
this, the probability of other intelligent life existing somewhere in space seems
overwhelming. Since Hoyle's estimates, new observations have indicated that
the universe is about twice as large as previously thought. Gray, A Larger
and Older Universe, 188 Scientific American 56 (1953). Thus the probable
number of planetary systems and the likelihood of intelligent life elsewhere in
space have been immensely increased.
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by which "natural law" may be discovered appear differently to
any two observers. Throughout history the disciples of "natural
law" have been in every political and legal camp.1 4 The theory has
been used to justify the maintenance of every established government, and to maintain man's inalienable right to rebel and overthrow
any established government. The "divine right of kings" was based
upon "natural law," and so were the democratic and egalitarian
ideals of the American revolution. There are those today who urge
"natural law" as an antidote to doctrines which lead to tyranny
and totalitarian government. Yet the most totalitarian of contemporary governments is firmly devoted to a "natural law" ideology.
Communism is philosophically committed to the view that the
"nature" of man and the world is such that a communistic social
organization is ultimately inevitable. The principles of communism
are declared not to be "subjective" ones that have been formulated
by philosophers, but rather "objective" facts which have been "discovered" in the natural order of things by Marx and his disciples.
Thus, in the preface to the first edition of his great work, Marx
compares his own observations to those of a physicist and says:
"Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree
of development of the social antagonisms that result from the
natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these
laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity
towards inevitable results."' 15
The reason for the amazing diversity among the adherents of
an ostensibly "objective" system is that the "nature" from which the
principles of "natural law" are deduced is not the same as the
"nature" which the scientist studies. The latter consists of the
physical objects and phenomenon of the world and the cosmos.
These can be identified, exhibited to and handled by one person, a
few or many with substantially the same results whenever the same
methods are followed. It is principally upon this characteristic that
modern science is founded. But the similarity between modern
science and the theory of "natural law" is exclusively a verbal one.
The "nature" in which the immutable principles of moral law are
found is not the realm of physical objects and phenomena but the
Platonic heaven of universals which have a "real existence"-but
only in the tales of philosophers. As physical science has not discovered and does not deal with universals, these are apprehended
not by the faculties of observation, but by the exercise of "reason."
14. See Stone, The Province and Function of Law 215-238 (1950).
15. Marx, Capital 13 (Modern Library ed. 1906).
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This term, too, has a special sense in this usage. Ordinarily human
"reason" denotes the ability to draw logical inferences from observed
facts or assumed premises. But since the principles of "natural law"
are themselves the basic premises of a system, they cannot be derived
by inference from other facts or premises. So when the term "reason" is used to indicate the method of discovering "natural law" it
can mean only some faculty by which truths are intuitively apprehended. Thus it comes to this: that "natural law" is anything which
one who asserts its existence intuitively apprehends, strongly believes in or stoutly asserts. Disregarding accidental similarities of
terminology, there is nothing in common between the operation of
the scientist and of the "natural law" philosopher.
Indeed, for all its pretensions to universality and objectivity, the
doctrine of "natural law" is pre-eminently the rationalization of subjectivity in legal thinking. Pound says that by the latter part of the
eighteenth century this tendency had become so strong that its implications were anti-social,
"For in effect it made the individual conscience the ultimate
arbiter of political and legal obligations." * * *16 "Nor was the
classical natural-law theory less vulnerable on its juristic than
on its political side. It came practically to this, that each philosophical jurist made his personal ethical views the test of the
validity of legal precepts and the pattern for new precepts or for
new shapings of old ones."'1
Probably the most important function of a theory of "natural
law" is the reassurance it gives to those who embrace it. To say that
"the law should be thus and so because I think so" can hardly be
thought by anyone to be a very important or persuasive statement.
But to say that "the law should be thus and so because I have discovered an 'objective principle of natural law, eternal and immutable' which embodies this conclusion" sounds like a most significant and impressive pronouncement. Since all that is necessary to
transform the former statement into the latter is the assumption that
one is intuitively apprehending such eternal verities, it is not surprising that a good many men are willing to make, or at least assert,
such an assumption. Justice Holmes made a characteristically trenchant comment on this tendency, saying:
"It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that
his lady is a very nice girl-if you do not admit that she is the
best that God ever made or will make, you must fight. There is
in all men a demand for the superlative, so much so that the poor
16. Pound, Law and Morals 94 (1924).
17. Id. at 96.
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devil who has no other way of reaching it attains it by getting
drunk. It seems to me that this demand is at the bottom of the
philosopher's effort to prove that truth is absolute and of the
jurist's search for criteria of universal
validity which he collects
'
under the head of natural law." s
Another powerful, although perhaps less palpable, reason for
claiming the sanction of ultimate principles for one's legal conclusions is the escape from the logical necessity of offering specific
support for them and submitting them to the uncertain process of
examination and analysis by others. One who offers a conclusion as
his own opinion, or as his inference from particular data, is at least
logically required to state how and why he has arrived at the result,
or risk having his opinion adjudged arbitrary and untenable. But
one who asserts that a proposition is a fundamental principle of
"natural law" is saying both that he believes the proposition to be
a proper one and that it is, or should be, self-evident and requires
no further justification. Thus "natural law" offers its disciples not
only the glory of eternal and immutable superlatives, but also the
repose of knowledge acquired without investigation and certainty
achieved without private doubt or public debate. A proposition
offered as the conclusion of either an individual or a group is always
subject to questioning and refutation. But a proposition offered as a
principle of "natural law" is, simply by definition of the one who
offers it, beyond questioning and immune to refutation.
The difficulty with the assurance that is offered by "natural
law" theories is that even when all their assumptions are accepted
there is no available methodology for ascertaining the content of the
universal principles from which such assurance flows. If we take a
theistic version of "natural law" then w'e introduce the religious
problem of divine revelation and interpretation into civil law. As
theologians have not yet come to any general agreement on a body
of doctrine which may represent the word of God as to basic religious matters, it is hardly likely that lawyers will be more successful in securing an even more detailed set of rules through the process
of direct revelation. This is the aspect of the matter that is almost
always overlooked by the advocates of "natural law" theories. It is
notable that most of their dissertations, including the carefully and
scholarly work of Wild, avoid any attempt to give specific illustrations of the application of the proposed method and are confined to
18. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 310 (1920). This
is from the classic essay on "Natural Law." To anyone interested in the
subject, the whole of it is worth reading, or re-reading, if for nothing else
than the beautiful clarity of language and thought.
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vague assertions concerning the existence and discoverability of
certain "universal" principles. What the nature of these "universal"
principles is and how they will aid in solving concrete legal problems
is never explicated. Yet, as Pound has pointed out,
"The number of problems confronting the courts which can be
solved from universally accepted precepts of morals or justice
or pure reason is not large. For the greater part all that can
be done is to find workable adjustments of relations and orderings of conduct which will satisfy most of the expectations incident to life in civilized society with the least friction and waste."' 9
The inescapable fact is that any sort of transcendental or theistic
"natural law" is completely and incorrigibly equivocal. Whatever
other function it may have, it is practically useless as a guide to
decision and action in a mundane system of civil law.
On the other hand, the kind of "natural law" sometimes said to
inhere in the scientific laws of physical nature 20 introduces new elements of ambiguity into the theory. To begin with, physical nature
as such does not have any very obvious claim to moral authority
over the conduct of man, unless we assume it to be merely an expression of some transcendental order of being, which brings us
back to the original form of the theory. Passing over this point, we
come next to the quite apparent fact that physical nature does not
offer us any explicity articulated principles of any kind. Even in the
physical sciences "nature" jealously guards her secrets, demanding
man's greatest ingenuity to discover underlying uniformities. So,
such a version of "natural law" offers us no more than a promise
that we may use principles discovered by established branches of
science as starting points for legal reasoning.
There are probably few who would quarrel with a proposal to
use established principles and facts of natural science in legal philosophy to the extent that they are relevant and useful. What is
wanting is a demonstration-or even an illustration-that any substantial contribution to law can be made by applying the deductive
method systematically to the principles of natural science. No
judge or lawyer is likely to defy the law of gravity in his argument.
But if anyone knows how to reason logically from the law of
gravity to the decision of any specific legal problem, that fact has
not been disclosed publicly.
This is not to say that scientific methods and knowledge may not
usefully be employed to discover facts and data that are helpful in
19. Pound, The Heated Judicial Dissent,39 A. B. A. T.794, 796 (1953).
20. Apsey, op. cit. .supranote 5.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:191

reaching decisions as to legal problems. The writer, among many
others, has suggested that this can be done.2' But this is quite a
different matter than the attempt to take general scientific principles
and by deductive inference construct a system of legal principles
from them. In the application of scientific method to the field of
law, which has been called "jurimetrics," the problem comes first;
the methods to be employed and the facts to be sought are determined after analysis of and in relation to the problem. In the attempt
to construct a system of mundane "natural law" from scientific data,
the general principles come first and an attempt is made to subsume
problems, as they arise, under one or another established principle.
Perhaps this point indicates as well as anything the logical weakness implicit in the philosophical theories which attempt to base
all law upon some single concept. It is of great significance that none
of the major systems of philosophical jurisprudence--"natural law,"
utilitarianism, pragmatism, and their numerous variants-has yet
produced a practical working system of specific legal principles.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, the philosophical attempt to enunciate a single principle which will encompass all other
legal principles necessarily requires a doctrine of such generality
that it is of virtually no assistance in formulating any concepts on a
more concrete level than that of ontology. Second, this involves the
assumption, so far undemonstrated and undemonstrable, that all
legal problems have significant elements in common and that all
specific legal rules may be related to some single general principle
in a significant manner. It is logically possible that there may be
some single unifying principle underlying all aspects of the law.
However, at this stage of development there is no clear or persuasive reason for assuming that to be so. Certainly there is no apparent
common element in the diverse problems arising in law in such
classes as those now conventially termed "homicide," ".marriage,"
"citizenship," "contract," "real estate," "taxation," "corporations,"
"motor vehicle traffic," "remedies," and so on throughout the legal
lexicon. Yet these are the actual stuff of the law. It is not enough
for philosophical theory to square with already established attitudes
toward a few fundamental matters such as the impropriety of murder
and every man's right to eat. All philosophical theories recognize
these truisms-but unfortunately few go much beyond them. That is
why the philosophical theories of the law which make up the bulk
of "jurisprudence," have aroused limited acceptance and small
21. Loevinger, Jurinetrics,33 Minn. L. Rev. 455 (1949).
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interest among either lawyers or the general public. 2 A theory

which does no more than complicate the commonplace is not very
useful. Until jurisprudence gives us new tools or data with with
to meet the mill-run of legal problems, it will not be taken seriously
by any but academicians, nor will it deserve to be.
The limitations and inadequacies of all the variant theories regrading the nature and foundations of law should suggest that the
problem with which they are dealing is either improperly formulated or is being incorrectly approached. There is substantial precedent for supposing this to be so. both in physical science and in
formal logic we have found in recent years that "solutions" to problems of long standing depended primarily upon recognition that the
problems themselves had been erroneously formulated and required
restatement. In the field of philosophy particularly much of the
difficulty has arisen from unrecognized implications or limitations
of the language used to express the problem. Thus, to ask "What is
the 'essence' of a chair?"--or of "the law?", or of "justice?"--implies that there is a single entity represented by such name, that it
has behind it some mysterious thing called its "essence," and that we
can somehow discover and correlate these things. But these are
gratuitous assumptions, which, if not demonstrably false, are at least
quite useless. Indeed, it is impossible to think of any logical or
empirical test which would demonstrate the truth of such assumptions, and consequently it is logically impossible to demonstrate their
falsity. On the other hand, such assumptions do lead to great confusion in consideration of the subject matter and to wholly futile metaphysical disputation.
This viewpoint is set forth in a remarkably cogent and provocative fashion in a recent book by the English philosopher, Professor
Weldon.2-3 The classical theory of meaning, he says, encouraged the
22. The term "jurisprudence," like the term "law" itself is a chameleon
word without any clearly defined usage. Its most frequent connotations include the philosophical theories of law discussed in the text. This is the usage
which is adopted in this article. However, Stone uses the term to mean the
examination of law in the light of other disciplines. Stone, op. cit. supra note
14, at 25. In this sense, jurisprudence is something quite different from the
body of philosophical speculations which are usually included within its scope,
and which are discussed in the present article.
23. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics (Penguin Books 1953). Although the author of this book is concerned principally to consider what the
title suggests, this is inevitably of substantial importance to the lawyer, for
the vocabulary of politics is also very largely the vocabulary of law. Thus,
the book contains a discussion of such terms as "the state," "authority,"
"rights," "law," and "freedom." Whether or not the reader agrees either with
the author's general viewpoint or with his comments on specific topics, it is
doubtful if anyone can read this book thoughtfully without deriving substantial profit from it. It is written in a straightforward and lucid style, without
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assumption that truths about facts could be discovered by inquiry
into the meaning of words. But,
"There is nothing sacred or immutable about symbols. They are
the products of human ingenuity and are as definite as we want
them to be in their application....
"In the light of these general considerations it is evident that
to ask 'What is the essential meaning of "justice"?' is unprofitable. Like most other words in ordinary use, 'justice' has no
single nuclear meaning. There is no precise criterion for its
correct employment, and it is useful largely because it lacks such
precision. We can, if we find it convenient to do so, give it a
precise or fairly precise meaning, and then it ceases to be vague
or ambiguous and becomes a technical or semi-technical word.
It is not uncommon, especially in legal terminology, for this to
be done and for the ordinary and technical uses of a word
24 to survive side by side as in the cases of 'fraud' and 'property.'
"Natural rights are like conventions in the sense that there is
nothing logically necessary about them. They might have been
otherwise, but there are usually quite good reasons for them, and
codified laws are natural in the sense that they are never just
arbitrary. They are formalizations not inventions .... 25
"Hence attempts to make 'right' a technical term and to draw
a sharp distinction between legal and natural rights are misconceived. 'Right' is useful largely because it is vague. But
although questions about rights are not theoretically difficult to
manage, the full answers to them are nearly always highly complicated. Hence there is always a considerable temptation to emthe usual academic trappings of scholarly and obscure allusions or frequent

relapses into an esoteric lexicon. Mr. Weldon is not concerned to offer us
definitive answers to the problems of politics, but rather seeks to assist in
finding a formulation of the problems that will permit answers to be sought
intelligently. He suggests that many of the problems have been incorrectly

formulated in the past because of a failure to understand the significance of
symbols, and their possible use and abuse. Thus the traditional approach has
been to assume that there was some meaning inherent in words like "the
state," "right," "law," "good," etc., and that a sufficiently diligent examination of these and related symbols was capable of disclosing such a meaning.
Mr. Weldon's thesis is perhaps best epitomized in his own summary of his
last chapter: "It is intended to show that when verbal confusions are tidied
up most of the questions of traditional political philosophy are not unanswerable. All of them are confused formulations of purely empirical difficulties.
This does not mean that these are themselves easy to deal with, but it does
mean that writers on political institutions and statesmen, not philosophers,
are the proper people to deal with them. As empirical questions they do have
answers, but the answers are neither simply nor demonstrably and incorrigibly true, nor can they be discovered by any process of non-empirical intuition. What we need to get us out of our political difficulties is a good deal
more thought and a good deal less emotion than is usually devoted to them."
(p. 192-193)

This is, by all odds, the best written and most sensible book in this general field that the present writer has read in a very long time.
24. Id. at 22-23.
25. Id. at 60.
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brace the illusion of absolute standards and to pretend that what
is needed to answer them is not a detailed study of comparative
institutions but some special insight into real, true, or absolute
right. And so we get the erroneous notion of a metaphysical cupboard in which Rights, Values, and Standards generally are
stored
and to which only professional metaphysicians possess the
2
key."-

G

Even to engage in the argument as to whether "natural law" or
convention or pragmatism, or utilitarianism, or some other theory
of law is the "right" one is to fall into the trap of granting the major
premise: that the term "law" represents a single nuclear meaning,
that it has an essence and that some single philosophical or metaphysical principle somehow "explains" or "justifies" this essence.
Once these assumptions are taken for granted, we are confined
within an intellectual framework of words. We can bandy the words
back and forth, combine and re-combine them, but we cannot
add to our knowledge.
The difficulty with such a situation is that the belief in and search
for absolutes blinds us to the facts of life. We are dealing with
psuedo-problems; we are prevented from getting meaningful
answers because we are not asking meaningful questions. The question, "How many angels can dance on the point of a pin?" may
have been an apocryphal issue among the medieval scholastics, but
it well epitomizes the futile character of much scholastic disputation.
The history of human thought is replete with examples of the belief
in absolutes leading to the refusal to accept or even consider what
we now regard as elementary facts. The Ptolemaic viewpoint that all
celestial movement must be regarded as orbital revolution around
the earth persisted until Copernicus succeeded in introducing the
concept that motion was relative, not absolute, and that much more
satisfactory results could be obtained in systematizing observations
on this basis. But even Copernicus was influenced by the idea that
since the circle was the "most perfect" form, celestial orbits must be
circular. Later Kepler and Galileo demonstrated that planetary
orbits were much better described as elliptical than circular. The
most dramatic illustration of the dominance of ideas of an absolute
is the ancient notion that "up" and "down" are directions which do
not vary from place to place or time to time. Thus it was argued
that the world could not possibly be round, for, if it was, people
on the other side would be walking with their feet "up" and their
heads "down," water would be required to fall "up" rather than
"down" and other equally absurd consequences would follow.
26. Id. at 61.
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Today it does not take much sophistication to accept the relativity of physical concepts such as motion and direction. We have
discarded such transcendental and non-empirical entities as phlogiston and ether. We regard debates as to the corporeal characteristics of angels as foolish. Yet it is still argued that mundane experience and human judgment are not enough justification for acceptance of a moral or legal principle-somewhere and somehow we
must find some absolute foundation, eternal and immutable. It is not
enough for the absolutist philosopher that all of mankind approve
a law, he insists that we take a poll of the angels. Even this might
be regarded as a harmless philosophical eccentricity were it not for
the fact that mankind and its opinion is a supernumerary in this
scheme, and that the celestial opinion-as revealed to the philosopher
-is all that counts.
This celestial opinion poll approach to values is as futile as the
counting of angels on a pin point. The quest is a hopeless one not
simply because of the difficulty of counting angels, but because it is
a search for an answer to a psuedo-problem and not to a real one.
It insinuates that there is something mysterious and requiring explanation about the fact that certain behaviour is regarded as reprehensible and other conduct is regarded as desirable in society. Such
a viewpoint even suggests that we are not competent to determine
what is desirable and undesirable conduct unless we have the
guidance of some absolute or transcendental code. But the best
evidence that a thing is visible is the fact that someone sees it. The
best evidence that something is audible is the fact that someone
hears it. Elaborate theories of the process of sight or hearing are
not only unnecessary; they are irrelevant. Similarly, the best proof
that something is desirable is the fact that someone desires it; and
that is is socially desirable, the fact that most people desire it. Elaborrate theories as to what people should desire, or how or why desire
operates are not only unnecessary, they are irrelevant.
Thus we are brought to face the same situation that has been
found in other fields of knowledge: that the belief in absolutes takes
us on a cosmic wild goose chase and prevents study and recognition
of the observable facts of actual life. The prosaic facts of terrestial
life seem trivial and unimportant when compared with the celestial
glories of eternal verities. Vhy bother to reach for pebbles if one
can grasp a star? But human knowledge has not yet developed any
philosophical sky-hooks. The best we have been able to do is deal
with terrestial problems in a mundane way.
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Unless one simply assumes the conclusion, it is extremely difficult to suggest any reason why this should not be good enough.
There is no use in reaching out for cosmic foundations to put under
a chicken coop. For such a task it is much more useful to pay close
attention to the grain and strength of the lumber, as determined
by simple practical tests, and to the character of the ground upon
which you plan to build, then it is to have a comprehensive theory
of cosmology or even of theoretical physics. Abstract theorizing is
significant only as it is responsive to some genuine problem and related to ascertainable facts. If any one principle of modern science
deserves to be called more fundamental and important than the
others, it is the one embodied in the famous maxim known as
"Occam's Razor": Do not multiply entities beyond necessity-that
is, the simplest theory that will explain the facts has the greatest
claim to validity. As a pervading principle of modern thought, this
deserves application in the field of legal theory.
There is no reason to think that the law needs or profits from an
attempt to seek foundations in the devious ramifications of ontology
or metaphysics. The problem of the law concerns terrestial chicken
coops, not stars or even planets. The methods and theories of the
law must be responsive to its problems if they are to be anything
more than more logomachy. The proof of this lies in our history;
for in this the lawyers have been wiser than the philosophers. The
questions of metaphysics, and the related questions of philosophical
jurisprudence, are no nearer solution today than they were in the
days of Socrates, and there is, if anything, a greater variety of
proposed answers and a smaller area of agreement. On the other
band, many practical problems of the law are being solved, at least
tolerably well, daily by lawyers and judges. Sometimes it is easier
to perceive the appropriate disposition of a controversy than to
know the reason for it, and often the courts are hard put to rationalize decisions which, in themselves, do not seem to involve much
doubt. Often legal results are more widely approved than legal
reasoning. Yet by and large, in practical operation, legal theory
(whether "right" or "wrong" in any particular case) has fairly
well avoided the confused labyrinths of metaphysics and has founded
itself upon principles of conduct which have received their sanction
by community acceptance.
In this course there is not only wisdom but responsibility.
Whether consciously so motivated or not, the theories which seek
to derive moral or legal principles from some absolute code have the
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effect of seeming to shift the responsibility for decision from the
human beings involved to the superhuman entity, whether an anthropromorphic or pantheistic deity. On the other hand, the theories
which take account of the relative and social nature of moral and
legal values make it much more difficult to conceal or obscure the responsibility involved in making a decision on any legal issue.
Ultimately it comes to this: that no single theory or philosophy
of law has so far demonstrated an adequacy or acceptability sufficient to warrant sole or principal reliance upon it, and attitude toward legal problems is much more important than any general
theory that may be invoked for their solution. Each philosophy does
emphasize some significant factor which needs to be taken into account. Theories of "natural law" suggest we cannot neglect man's
emotional need for identification with something greater than himself. Emphasis of the traditional element indicates that the law
must maintain a reasonable stability to perform its function adequately. Utilitarianism emphasizes that the function of law and
philosophy is to serve mankind, and not the reverse. Pragmatism
teaches that the only data we have to work with is experience, and
that all our knowledge derives from this. With respect to specific
legal problems, the voices of God, of tradition, of the people and of
experience usually speak in Delphic equivocations. A doctrinaire
insistence that the answer to all our problems must be found in
spinning out the implications thought to be found in one of these
elements, to the exclusion of others, cannot serve either the individual or society or be reconciled with the principles of wisdom and
sound thinking which have been accepted in other fields.
Fortunately the legal philosophy of judges and lawyers in practice has been eclectic and catholic, so that the law has not rested upon7
2
any foundation so shaky as the formulations of a particular theory.
Had the latter been the case, our legal institutions could not have
survived and grown as they have to the present. The viability of law
depends not upon its adherence to any theory, but rather upon the
maintenance of an attitude of receptiveness, inquiry and skepticism.
The law, in its most general sense, represents society's effort to be
rational in controlling the relations among men. The characteristics
of rationality, in the light of the best of modem thought and knowledge, include, at a minimum, an open-minded willingness to hear
and consider any idea or theory, a passion for facts leading to
active inquiry, and a skepticism as to one's own conclusions as well
as those of others.
27.

See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
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Such an attitude will not guarantee the "right" answer to legal
problems (if there is such a thing), or even any answer to specific
problems. No philosophy, theory or formula will do that. There is
no intellectual hocus-pocus that will enable a judge confronted with
a difficult case to escape the unpleasant necessity of wrestling with
his own conscience and making his own decision. But an attitude
of open-mindedness, inquiry and skepticism will give some assurance that whatever decision is made will be reached only after consideration of all relevant facts and arguments and after sincere and
earnest efforts to apply the best available contemporary standards
to the issues involved.
The difficulty with any formalized theory or philosophy of law
is that it tends to emphasize one aspect of all legal problems, to
exclude consideration of other aspects and ideas, to limit inquiry
and to encourage dogmatism as to conclusions. It has been said
that a creed is a monument set up to show where a man has stopped
thinking. There is enough validity in this to make a rational mind
uncomfortable with any doctrine which claims to encompass all
mundane truth and to possess the only map showing the way to
justice. Insofar as legal creeds, theories or philosophies demand exclusive allegiance or promise absolute certainty they tend to create
attitudes of dogmatism which are incompatible with the full freedom
and activity of the intellect that is a necessary condition of rational
determination. It has long been recognized that intellectual freedom
and rational thinking by lawyers and judges are essential to a
proper and efficient operation of the legal system. Thus to the extent
that legal creeds, theories and philosophies imply or encourage
dogmatic attitudes, they are a handicap to the law.
On the other hand, to the extent that philosophical speculation
tends to draw attention to matters that might otherwise be overlooked it performs a useful function. This is, in fact, the principal
role that legal philosophies play in the legal system. In spite of their
pretensions, none of the major philosophical systems does much
more than offer a partial rationalization of currently accepted principles. Thus the "golden rule," in one form or another, is found
in all creeds and is sanctioned by all the variant systems of "natural
law," utilitarianism and pragmatism. So it is with most of the
fundamental working rules of law. The divergent viewpoint of the
philosophies do not imply different legal principles, but merely
different rationalizations for accepted principles. So far as general
principles are concerned, the systems of philosophical jurisprudence
lead to substantially the same results.
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But it is axiomatic that general principles do not decide specific
cases. What is wanted is not a cosmological reason for favoring
virtue and opposing vice, but a practical method for dealing with
the recalcitrant and aberrant facts of the daily evidence in the courtroom. For this purpose an attitude of passive reliance on and dogmatic assertion of the principles of any legal creed or philosophical
system is worse than useless, it is actually hampering. Without pretending to have found any ultimate answers, the best that courts and
lawyers can do now with legal problems is to bring to them an attitude of open-minded receptiveness to all theories and ideas, an indefatigable willingness to inquire into the facts, and a skepticism as
to all inferences and conclusions, particularly their own.
A similar attitude of skepticism toward legal dogma will serve
society and the citizen equally as well as it does the courts and
lawyers. It is the fanatics bred by dogmatism that have made the
bloody revolutions and inquisitions in the world; organized skeptics
have burned no heretics. Dogmatism promotes uniformity and intolerance; skepticism encourages diversity and tolerance. Democracy needs diversity and tolerance among its citizens for survival.
Carried to its ultimate logical conclusion, any absolute theory of law
is subversive of a stable government. The true believer in any dogmatic theory of law is logically bound to disobey the law as a conscientious objector whenever it comes in conflict with the principles
of his theory. But the citizen who cherishes a wholesome skepticism
toward all absolute theories of law or morals is much less likely to
indulge in the presumption of disregarding the judgment of organized society solely on the basis of his own conclusions. There is
always the possibility of a conviction so strong as to move him to
this, though it is unlikely that any abstract theory, or anything less
than what appears to him as immediate and compelling necessity,
will do so. Thus obedience to the, law as a norm of conduct is not a
matter of indifference or cowardice, but a rational recognition of the
fallibility of individual judgment and a reasonable response to the
respect due the judgment of the community by the individual. Fortunately such an attitude of skepticism probably comes closer to
representing the actual viewpoint of the average person than any
particular philosophical theory of jurisprudence. So, we may conclude that the individual normally obeys the law not because it is
always right - which everyone doubts--, or because of lack of
courage, but rather because a rational skepticism warns against the
arrogance of defying the judgment of society embodied in formal
law.

